A substantial portion of the rise in Social Security Disability Insurance rolls since 1984 has been attributed to the Social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act. Using data from the National Health Interview Survey, I examine whom the Act effectively targeted. The analysis shows that new enrollees were demonstrably taller than previous enrollees, suggesting that the Act expanded eligibility to individuals in better health and socioeconomic circumstances.
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I. Introduction
The Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) program provides cash-transfers to individuals whose capacity for work is substantially limited. In 2008, the program provided $106 billion in benefits to 9.3 million disabled workers and their dependents. To target the work-disabled, the program requires potential beneficiaries to satisfy a set of medical criteria. 1 These criteria have changed since the program's inception to reflect working knowledge of functional limitations and health.
A major change to the program's medical eligibility criteria occurred in 1984 with the Social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act. The Act contained three particular amendments that likely expanded SSDI rolls. The first amendment relaxed the medical eligibility criteria by allowing claimants with multiple, non-severe disabilities to qualify for benefits; prior to the Act, a claimant must have had at least one severe medical impairment. The second amendment allowed pain associated with an identifiable medical condition to be considered in determining functional capacity. As a result, individuals with identifiable impairments causing pain, particularly musculoskeletal conditions, became newly eligible for benefits. The third amendment relaxed the eligibility criteria for mental illnesses by placing less weight on medical factors and more weight on functional factors. This statute increased the likelihood of an SSDI award, particularly for mental disorders other than "mental retardation".
By some accounts, the Act is responsible for much of the rise in SSDI rolls from 1984 to 2003 (Autor and Duggan, 2003; Autor and Duggan, 2006; Duggan and Imberman, 2008) .
Between these two years, the number of disabled-worker beneficiaries more than doubled from 2.60 million to 5.87 million, an increase of 126 percent. According to Duggan and Imberman (2008) , the rise in benefit receipt attributable to the Act can explain approximately 53 percent of growth among males and 38 percent of growth among females.
Despite the dramatic effect of the Act on disability receipt, few studies systematically examine whom the Act effectively targeted.
2 This study attempts to address this topic by simulating the population most likely affected by the policy. The main data source is the National Health Interview Survey, collected annually since 1957 to track health trends in the non-institutionalized, US population. For the current study, I use data years spanning 1983 to 1986 and 1992 to 1996 (hereafter, the former data period is referred to as 1983 and the latter as 1992, respectively). I restrict the empirical analysis to males since the Act had a larger impact on SSDI enrollment among them. SSDI receipt is not explicitly reported in these data, so I determine SSDI receipt by whether an individual is enrolled in Medicare.
Using NHIS data, I first demonstrate the degree to which Medicare receipt approximates SSDI receipt -the latter measured from administrative data -over time. I show that the rate of Medicare receipt among individuals with musculoskeletal conditions closely approximates levels and changes in the rate of SSDI receipt for this condition, but grossly underestimates SSDI receipt for mental illness. Therefore, for the empirical analysis, I focus on the rise in SSDI receipt for musculoskeletal conditions only.
I then examine the extent to which the rise in SSDI receipt for musculoskeletal conditions overstates or understates the likely impact of the policy. On one hand, SSDI receipt may overestimate the impact of the policy if new beneficiaries categorized as musculoskeletal after the Act would have, in the absence of the Act, been enrolled in SSDI and categorized as something else. On the other hand, the rate of SSDI receipt may actually underestimate the 2 For a review of transfer programs targeted at the disabled, see Bound and Burkhauser (1999) . The employment estimate presented here is considerably lower than the highest, upperbound estimate found in previous studies. In a seminal study, Bound (1989) measures the counterfactual, upper-bound level of employment among SSDI beneficiaries by the employment level of rejected SSDI applicants; the explicit assumption is that employment of accepted applicants can be no greater than employment of rejected applicants. 4 Using the Survey of Disability and Work, he finds that, among rejected male applicants aged 45 to 54, 36.7 percent were employed at time of the survey in 1972 and 48.9 percent were employed at the time of the survey in 1978; in other words, the effect of SSDI benefits on the rate of employment, at most, ranges from -0.37 to -0.49. Thus, relative to previous studies, this study provides a lower, upperbound effect of SSDI on employment.
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II. Aggregate Changes in SSDI Receipt
The potential impact of the Act on disability rolls can be measured summarily by changes in SSDI receipt rates over time. Aggregate rates of receipt among males in 1986 and 1993 are presented in the left panel of Table 1 , and rates of receipt by diagnostic category are presented in the left panel of Table 2 . The numerator -the number of SSDI beneficiaries -comes from Ferron (1995) who, using administrative data from the SSA, reports the total number of SSDI beneficiaries in December of 1986 and 1993; the denominator -the estimated population of males -comes from US Census data.
As shown in Table 1 , the rate of SSDI receipt increases with age: in 1986, the rate increased from 1.27 percent among males aged 30 to 39 to 11.73 percent among males aged 60
to 64. The change in receipt from 1986 to 1993, however, is greater among younger malesamong males aged 60 to 64, the rate actually declines by 0.11 percentage points. Table 2 shows rates by diagnostic categories. The first three row sections -A, B, and Ccorrespond to musculoskeletal conditions, circulatory conditions, and mental illness, respectively. As shown, the change in receipt rate is greatest for musculoskeletal conditions and mental illness -the former more so than the latter -suggesting that the Act had a measurable effect on SSDI rolls. For musculoskeletal conditions, the level increase is greatest among the aged, but the relative increase is greatest among the young. A similar pattern is evident for mental illness. In contrast, the rate of receipt for circulatory conditions declined, particularly among the aged.
The relative increase in benefit receipt for musculoskeletal and mental illness suggests that the Act had a considerable impact on SSDI rolls. The implicit assumption of this interpretation is that the rate of receipt for these conditions would have remained relatively 6 constant had the Act not been implemented. 5 Even with the stable-rate assumption, however, the change in benefit receipt may not accurately represent the effect of the Act. The ambiguity arises since the Act also granted benefits to individuals with multiple, non-severe disabilities.
Thus, the first concern is that, following the Act, beneficiaries with multiple disabilities may have been categorized as musculoskeletal or mental illness, but, in the absence of the Act, would have been (or eventually would have been) awarded benefits and categorized as something else.
If so, the aggregate change in SSDI receipt, particularly for musculoskeletal and mental illness, would overstate the true effect of the Act.
The second concern is that individuals with multiple disabilities, including a musculoskeletal condition, may have been awarded benefits as a result of the Act, but the musculoskeletal condition was never the main cause for the inability to work. If these individuals were awarded benefits but not categorized as musculoskeletal or mental illness, then the aggregate change in SSDI receipt for these conditions would understate the true effect of the Act. focus the empirical analysis on males.
III. Addressing the Limitations of
B. Aggregate Changes in Medicare Receipt
I first examine whether the rate of Medicare receipt estimated from the NHIS is a reasonable approximation to the rate of SDDI receipt measured from administrative data.
Estimates of Medicare receipt are presented in the right panel of In Table 2 , I examine rates of Medicare receipt across diagnostic categories. Individuals are assigned to diagnostic categories by their reported, main disability. As shown, the level in
Medicare receipt is similar to the level of SSDI receipt for musculoskeletal and circulatory conditions, but slightly underestimates circulatory conditions at older ages.
Rates of receipt for mental illness and "other" conditions are presented in row-sections C and D, respectively. As shown, Medicare receipt for mental illness systematically underestimates SSDI receipt, which may reflect that beneficiaries with mental illness are under the care of someone else or, since the NHIS represents the non-institutionalized population, are institutionalized. The estimates may also reflect stigma of reporting a mental illness. For "other" conditions, the rate of Medicare receipt is less than SSDI receipt, but the change Medicare receipt is comparable to the change in SSDI receipt.
C. Empirical Strategy
To address the limitations of SSDI data in measuring the effect of the Act, I examine the change in disabilities reported by Medicare enrollees who report having "any" musculoskeletal condition. The reason for considering any musculoskeletal condition -rather than a musculoskeletal condition as the main cause -stems from the limitations of aggregate measures of receipt described above. First, if the prevalence of main musculoskeletal conditions -reported in Table 2 -increased by more than the prevalence of any musculoskeletal conditions, then the difference likely reflects categorical reassignment of beneficiaries who would have been awarded benefits in the absence of the Act, though categorized as non-musculoskeletal. And second, if the prevalence of main musculoskeletal conditions increased by less than the prevalence of any musculoskeletal conditions, the difference may reflect beneficiaries who became newly eligible for benefits after the Act, but were assigned to a non-musculoskeletal category.
The working assumption is that the number and composition of enrollees who report any musculoskeletal condition before and after the Act is a result of the Act itself. This assumption seems plausible since the share of new enrollees for musculoskeletal conditions appears stable shortly before the Act (Duggan and Imberman 2008). 9 The assumption also implies that the policy did not induce preexisting enrollees to report a musculoskeletal condition. This additional assumption also seems plausible since -having already been awarded benefits -previous beneficiaries have no obvious incentive to report a musculoskeletal condition in response to the Act.
D. Work-Limiting Disabilities
The rate of Medicare receipt among males who report any musculoskeletal condition, as well as the rate of those who report a musculoskeletal condition as the main cause, is reported in the top two row of Table 3 . The figures in the first and second panels correspond to before and after the Act, respectively; and within each panel, the sample is disaggregated into four age categories. The rate of any musculoskeletal condition is greater than the rate of musculoskeletal conditions as the main cause since not all enrollees report the condition as their main disability.
As indicated, among the two oldest age categories, the prevalence of any musculoskeletal condition increased by less than the prevalence of musculoskeletal conditions as the main cause.
The increase in the latter prevalence among males aged 60 to 64 was 0.50 percentage points ( In contrast to the older age categories, the prevalence of any musculoskeletal condition among younger males increased by more than the prevalence of musculoskeletal conditions as the main cause. For males aged 30 to 39, the change in "main" and "any" was 0.11 and 0.14,
respectively. This suggests that the aggregate change in SSDI receipt among the young may only reflect 80 percent of total increase due to the policy (0.11/0.14).
To which categories new, younger beneficiaries with musculoskeletal conditions are being assigned -and from which categories new, older beneficiaries are being alternatively assigned -can be determined by the change in proportions of beneficiaries by the "main" disability category. These proportions, reported as percents in Table 3 , were assigned as "other", implying that the Act may be responsible for as much as one-half (0.22*.014/0.07) of the rise in beneficiaries assigned to the "other" category reported in Table 2 .
The same simulation for the two oldest age categories yields unrealistic proportions, exceeding one for musculoskeletal and negative for circulatory and other. These proportions arise since the prevalence of those who report any musculoskeletal condition increased by less than the prevalence of those who report a musculoskeletal condition as the main cause. To correct this implausibility, I assign all new beneficiaries (0.40 and 0.50 percent of males aged 50 to 59 and 60 to 64, respectively) to the musculoskeletal category, and adjust the proportions for the circulatory and other categories to yield the observed proportions in 1992. This calculation, provided in Appendix Table A, suggests that 3.8 percent of new musculoskeletal enrollees aged 60 to 64 would have been assigned as circulatory in the absence of the policy. Thus, among males aged 60 to 64, the Act may be responsible for as much as 24 percent (0.038*4.0/0.52) of the decline in Medicare receipt for circulatory conditions.
IV. Effective Target Population
A. Demographic Characteristics
Similar to the analysis above, the demographics of the effective target of the Act can be inferred from changes in demographic characteristics among Medicare enrollees over time. If the characteristics of enrollees would have remained constant in the absence of the Act -an admittedly stronger assumption here than in the previous section -then the change in characteristics between 1983 and 1992 can be attributed to new enrollees as a result of the Act.
In contrast to the previous section, where the population of interest was enrollees reporting any musculoskeletal condition, the current analysis focuses exclusively on enrollees who report a musculoskeletal condition as the main cause. To improve the precision of the estimates from this restricted sample, I pool observations into two age categories: 30 to 49 and 50 to 64.
Demographic changes are reported in Table 4 . The first through fourth columns report average characteristics for each age and year category pairs, and the final two columns report the change in demographics between 1983 and 1992. As shown, the only statistically significant changes among enrollees are the likelihood of living in the Northeast (specifically among males aged 50 to 64) and height. On average, Medicare enrollees aged 30 to 49 and 50 to 64 were 2.8 centimeters and 1.7 centimeters taller, respectively, in 1992 compared to enrollees in 1983.
The estimates suggest that the Act effectively targeted those who were taller, on average, than previous enrollees. Previous studies show that adult height is strongly associated with height as a child, and child height in turn is determined by early-life nutrition and health (see Case and Paxson 2008) . Since early-life nutrition and health may positively impact both health and economic outcomes in adulthood, the increased height of Medicare enrollees suggests that, in comparison to previous enrollees, the Act targeted individuals in better health, better economic circumstances, or both.
An alternative interpretation of the increase in height, however, is that the overall height of the population is increasing. To examine this possibility, I examine the increase in average height among enrollees relative to the national average. These estimates are reported in the top 13 panel of Table 5 using a difference-in-differences framework. As shown, in 1983, young males enrolled in Medicare were 3.72 centimeters shorter than the national average. But the increase in height among enrollees of 2.8 centimeters reduced this difference to a statistically insignificant 1.04 centimeters. The differential increase in height among young enrollees aged 30 to 49 relative to the national average is therefore 2.68 (standard error: 1.2). The same pattern is apparent for older males: the differential increase in height among enrollees aged 50 to 64 was 1.18 centimeters (standard error: 0.73). Thus, the increase in height among enrollees, particularly young enrollees, cannot be explained by national trends.
Another alternative interpretation is that the relative change in height is mechanically related to the overall expansion of the SSDI program. To examine this possibility, I estimate the average height of enrollees who report "other" as their main disability with no musculoskeletal conditions. These estimates, also compared to the national average, are reported in the bottom of Table 5 . As shown, the differential rise in height among non-musculoskeletal enrollees was negligible and statistically insignificant. The results therefore suggest that the differential rise in height among enrollees for musculoskeletal conditions cannot be explained by a general expansion of the SSDI program.
B. Implications for Screening
The increase in height among enrollees with musculoskeletal conditions suggests that the Act targeted males who were taller than previous beneficiaries. A natural question is whether newly enrolled beneficiaries are, on average, shorter than those who claim to be unable to work because of a musculoskeletal condition, but who are not enrolled in Medicare in 1992. Table 4 and are assumed nonrandom.
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The predicted heights among previous enrollees, and the simulated heights among new enrollees, are reported in I then compare the simulated heights among new enrollees to non-enrollees in 1992 who report being unable to work because of a musculoskeletal condition. These estimated heights are reported in the far right panel of Table 6 . As shown, new enrollees are actually taller than nonenrollees by about 1.5 centimeters, though neither difference for the two age categories is statistically significant. One concern for this direct comparison, however, is that individuals may have been induced to report a musculoskeletal condition in response to the policy. 
V. Analysis of Labor Supply and Self-Reported Work Limitations by Height
A. Model
If the Act expanded SSDI rolls to included taller males, then, under certain assumptions, the effect of increased SSDI generosity on labor supply can be measured. I model the structural effect of SSDI receipt on labor supply using the following equation:
, .
In this model, is the labor market outcome; is a vector of individual characteristics; is a function of height which, conditional on , may proxy for health; , is an indicator of Medicare enrollment as a proxy for SSDI benefit receipt; and is the structural error term.
Since eligibility for SSDI benefits is determined by work opportunities and health status,
Medicare enrollment is a function of both and .
The empirical difficulty of measuring the effect of SSDI receipt on labor market outcomes, represented by the coefficient , arises since . is determined by both and , which themselves independently affect labor market outcomes. Therefore, using cross-sectional methods, would be identified solely from nonlinearities of , with respect to and ; for example, if SSDI receipt were modeled as, , , then is only identified by variation in and differences in and . Since may be correlated with , and and are not known, cross-sectional estimates of would be difficult to defend.
As an alternative identification strategy, I exploit the fact that the Act targeted males by height. In the context of the model, the Act affected SSDI receipt by manipulating the function . Conceptually, may be a discrete function of height since, given a fixed budget, the government may target individuals in poorest health. An expansion to the program would therefore increase the height threshold that determines the targeted and non-targeted population. Those most affected by the expansion would be taller than the former threshold but shorter than the new threshold; individuals just below the old threshold and above the new threshold would arguably not be affected by the reform. Under this framework, the effect of expanded SSDI benefits on labor supply can be modeled as:
, , where,
In the Medicare equation, is an indicator that equals one if the individual is observed in the post-Act period and his height falls within the height range targeted by the policy.
If is associated with increased Medicare receipt and satisfies the exclusion restriction (that and are uncorrelated), then serves an instrument for Medicare receipt and is identified. The exclusion restriction requires that, condition on and , the targeted height range is associated with labor supply only through the effect of increased benefit receipt. I pursue this empirical strategy in the next subsections.
A. Medicare Receipt
I begin by graphically examining the change in Medicare receipt by height. Plots of the Medicare receipt rate across ten height categories are presented in Figure 1 . 12 Panel A corresponds to males aged 30 to 49, and Panel B corresponds to males aged 50 to 64. As shown, among younger males, Medicare receipt decreased at the extreme ends of the height distribution and increased at the center. Further inspection of the data reveals that the increase at the center 12 The discreteness of the height categories reflects the values that the NHIS reports this variable. The height definitions reported in this study reflects the floor value of reported height in centimeters; so, for example, individuals assigned to the 162 to 165 category contains individuals whose height is greater than or equal to 162 and less than 165. The height categories span more than 99 percent of the sample, and the distribution of height does not change between 1983 and 1992 (not shown).
is largely driven by enrollees with musculoskeletal conditions, whereas the change at the extreme ends of the height distribution is not (not shown).
Among older males, Medicare receipt increased at the extreme ends of the height distribution, but there was no noticeable change near the center. Further inspection of the data reveals that the percent of enrollees with musculoskeletal conditions increased near the center of the distribution, but, on net, overall rates of receipt did not change. This is consistent with the results from section III: older males assigned as musculoskeletal after the Act would have been awarded benefits and assigned as something else in the absence of the Act.
Since Medicare receipt did not increase substantially among males aged 50 to 64, the proceeding analysis focuses on younger males only. And since the change in Medicare receipt at the extreme ends of the height distribution are unrelated to the Act, I focus on the seven height categories between 162 and 195 centimeters. Demographic characteristics and Medicare receipt rates for these height categories are presented in Table 7 . As shown, height is correlated with education, race, and veteran status, but is not strongly correlated with geographic region.
The change in Medicare coverage between 1983 and 1992 is shown in the bottom row of 
B. Graphical Analysis of Labor Supply and Work-Limitations
Before estimating the labor supply equation, I first examine the changes in labor supply and self-reported work limitations by height. These changes are shown graphically in Figure 2 .
19 Panels A and B contain rates of non-labor force participation and employment, respectively. As shown in panel A, the rate of non-labor force participation increased across all height levels, though the increase appears somewhat smaller for the highest height category. However, there is no noticeable change in employment levels for any height category, except for a slight decline in the shortest height category. Taken together, the figures suggest that the effect expanded SSDI benefits on labor force participation, if any, occurs among males who were previously unemployed.
In panels C and D, I plot the percent of males who report being unable to work and being unable to work specifically because of a musculoskeletal condition. As shown in panel C, the percent of males who report being unable to work increased across all height categories, but increased by more among shorter males. This pattern appears robust in panel D when the measure is defined by being unable to work because of a musculoskeletal condition. Thus, the range of heights targeted by the Act, which lies in the middle of the height distribution, does not appear to be associated with an increase in self-reported work limitations. If the relative change self-reported disabilities is a result of the Act (induced-responders), then the difference between simulated height of new enrollees in 1992 and height of non enrollees who are unable to workpresented in Table 6 -likely underestimates the difference in heights between new enrollees and non-induced, non-enrollees who are unable to work; in other words, new enrollees are taller than previous enrollees, but perhaps shorter than non-induced responders who were unable to work in 1992.
C. Implied Labor Supply Elasticity
The change in labor force non-participation relative to the change in SSDI receipt across height categories would provide a baseline measure of the effect of SSDI receipt on labor supply.
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But since height is correlated with numerous factors that may independently affect labor supplyboth cross-sectionally and over time -this baseline measure would provide an inaccurate estimate of the effect of SSDI benefits on labor supply.
I therefore begin by estimating the first-stage and reduced-form equations implied by the system of equations described above. More specifically, I estimate the following equation:
. The estimated coefficients are presented in columns 1, 3, and 5 of Table 8 for Medicare, labor force non-participation, and employment, respectively. Estimates of are reported in the top row. As shown, the targeted height range is associated with a 0.64 percentage point increase in Medicare receipt between 1983 and 1992. Medicare receipt generally decreases with height, as expected, and is positively associated with low education, being non-white, and living in the South. Shown in column (3), the targeted range is also associated with a considerable increase in labor force non-participation, increasing by 1.6 percentage points by 1992; and, similar to Medicare receipt, labor force non-participation is positively associated with low education, being non-white, and living in the South. In column (5), the targeted range is associated with a 0.43 percentage point decline in employment, but the coefficient is not statistically significant.
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Together, the coefficients on the target range indicator suggest large labor disincentive effects of SSDI benefits. The instrumental variable estimates for labor force non-participation and employment are reported in columns 1 and 3 of Table 9 , respectively. As shown, a one percentage point increase in SSDI receipt leads to a 2.5 percentage point increase in labor force non-participation and a 0.68 percentage point decrease in employment. The estimate for labor force non-participation is substantially higher than previous estimates (Parsons 1980 and Slade 1984) and is likely overstated. An obvious concern is that declining real wages among low skilled workers may have increased labor force non-participation and decreased employment independent of the Act (Juhn 1992; Juhn, Murphy, and Topel 1991). If so, and if these changes differentially affected males in the targeted height range, then the estimated impact of the Act on labor force non-participation and employment reported in columns 3 and 5 of Table 8 would be overstated.
To control for relative changes in labor supply independent of the Act, I re-estimate the equations allowing the effects of the characteristics in vector to vary with time. This more flexible specification would control for relative changes in labor supply that are unrelated to the Act to the extent that these characteristics and independent changes in labor supply are related.
The first-stage and reduced-form estimates using this more flexible specification are reported in columns 2, 4, and 6 of Table 8 . As shown, the increase in Medicare receipt among males in the targeted height range is robust to allowing the effects of to vary over time: the coefficient declines from 0.64 to 0.57 and remains statistically significant. However, the same coefficient for labor force non-participation declines from 1.6 to 0.27, and the coefficient for employment increases from -0.43 to -.06. Thus, it appears that the relative change in labor supply among males in the targeted height range can be largely explained by time-varying effects of basic demographic characteristics. As a result, the instrumental variable estimates of the effect of SSDI benefits on labor supply diminish. The estimates, reported in columns 2 and 4 of Table 9, imply that a one percentage point increase in SSDI receipt leads to a 0.48 percentage point increase in labor force non-participation and a 0.11 percentage point decline in employment.
The magnitude change of the estimates suggests that the rise in labor force nonparticipation and decline in employment associated with expansions to SSDI likely reflect changes to the labor market rather than the causal impact of SSDI benefits. The effect of labor market shocks on SSDI receipt has been previously documented elsewhere (Autor and Duggan, 2003; Duggan and Imberman, 2008; Black, Daniel, and Sanders 2002; and Rupp and Stapleton) .
Whether the estimates reflect the causal impact of SSDI benefits on labor supply remains unclear, however, since there are many other factors -in addition to those contained in the NHIS -that ideally would be controlled. Nonetheless, the decline in the labor force non-participation effect from 2.5 to 0.48 by the inclusion of basic demographic information likely indicates that 0.48 is an upper bound of the true effect. Similarly, the effect of a one percentage point increase in SSDI benefits on employment among young males is at most -0.11 percentage points in absolute value.
Relative to previous studies, the estimated effect of SSDI benefits on employment is most comparable to that of Bound (1989) . In his study, he measures the upper-bound effect of SSDI benefit receipt on employment by the employment rate of rejected SSDI applications. Using the Survey of Disability and Work, he finds that, among males rejected for SSDI benefits at ages 45 to 54 years old, the percent employed following rejection ranged from 36.7 to 48.9, depending on the survey year. These upper-bound estimates may be even larger when estimated among males 30 to 49 -the sample considered in this study -since younger males exhibit greater labor supply than older males following SSDI rejection (Bound 1989; von Wachter, Song, and Manchester 2009) .
The difference in estimates may reflect that the empirical strategy considered in this study differs fundamentally from Bound's. In Bound's study, the effect is measured from all rejected applicants, whereas, here, the estimate measures the effect of SSDI benefits on employment among those affected by the policy (Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin 1996; Heckman, 1997; Kling 2001) . Thus, the estimates taken together suggest that the marginal SSDI beneficiary has lower employment prospects than the average rejected SSDI applicant.
VI. Concluding Discussion
A significant proportion of the rise in SSDI rolls since 1984 has been attributed to the Social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act, yet few studies systematically examine whom the Act effectively targeted. I show that the rise in SSDI receipt for musculoskeletal conditions after the Act likely overstates the impact of the Act among older males and underestimates it among younger males. Additionally, the target population appears to have been in better health and socioeconomic circumstances, as evidenced by height, compared to previous enrollees.
Finally, the Act targeted young males who would have had low labor supply in the absence of the policy.
This study makes an important contribution to the broader understanding of the labor supply effects of SSDI benefits. Several studies have documented a simultaneous increase in labor force participation non-participation and SSDI receipt (Leonard1979, and Parsons 1980), suggesting that SSDI benefits have substantial effects on labor supply behavior. However, equivocating SSDI receipt with a behavioral response is misleading since those who are induced 24 out of the labor by SSDI benefits may not otherwise work (Bound and Burkhauser 1999) .
Indeed, Bound and Waidman (1992) find that males induced from the labor market do suffer from work limitations. If the upper bound effects of SSDI benefits on labor force nonparticipation and employment from this study are taken as the true effects, then more than twothirds of young males induced out of the labor market as a result of the Act of 1984 would have otherwise been unemployed. 1983-1986 1992-1996 1992-1996 1992-1996 50-59 Medicare Receipt Rate by Height: Males Aged 50 to 64 1982-1986 1992-1996 (A) (B) Ferron (1995) and US Census data. The numerator for SSDI receipt rate corresponds to December of the figure year; the denominator is based on the US civilian population in January in the year following the figure year. The prevalence of Medicare receipt is calculated using the National Health Interview Survey. Sampling weights -rescaled to sum within sample year to equal the sample size -were used. Ferron (1995) and US Census data. The numerator for SSDI receipt rate corresponds to December of the figure year; the denominator is based on the US civilian population in January in the year following the figure year. The prevalence of Medicare receipt is calculated using the National Health Interview Survey. Work-limited individuals who do not report their "main" condition were dropped from the sample. Sampling weights -rescaled to sum within sample year to equal the sample size -were used. Figures are calculated using the National Health Interview Survey. Work-limited individuals who do not report their "main" condition were dropped from the sample. Sampling weights -rescaled to sum within sample year to equal the sample size -were used. Table 3 for details. Height figure excludes some observations that do not report this value. Standard errors are in parentheses. * Indicates statistical significance at the 5 percent level, reported only for the change estimates. 1983 -1986 1992 -1996 Difference 1983 -1986 1992 -1996 1983 -1986 1992 -1996 Difference 1983 -1986 1992 -1996 Table 3 for details. Height figure excludes some observations that do not report this value. Standard errors are in parentheses. * Indicates statistical significance at the 5 percent level, reported only for the difference estimates. 1983-1986 1992-1996 1992-1996 1992-1996 1992-1996 Table 3 for details. Height figure excludes some observations that do not report this value. Standard errors are in parentheses. Table 3 for details. The sample is restricted to those with Medicare and height information. Standard errors are in parentheses. Table 3 for details. The sample is restricted to those with Medicare and height information. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * and ** indicate significance at the five and one percent level , respectively. Table 3 for details. The sample is restricted to those with Medicare and height information. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * and ** indicate significance at the five and one percent level , respectively.
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